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At the heart of the matter: household 
debt in contemporary banking and the 
international crisis
This paper, drawing on Marxist political economy, conceptualizes the phenomenon of activities of 
banks as determinants of the current crisis. The main argument is the most significant aspect of 
recent changes in banking activities has been the turn towards individual wage income as a source of 
bank profits. This can be summarized in two ideas. 1) the conflict between households and financial 
firms that leads to an over-indebtedness of the former during a context of disadvantageous social 
relations for borrowers, and 2) the existence of theoretical reasons that argue that the economic 
recovery is difficult because the negative impact on the household consumption. Hence, it is argued 
that the recession will have an unprecedented length in the absence of a significant public intervention 
in the labour and financial markets.
Este trabajo se apoya en la economía política marxista para conceptualizar el fenómeno de las ac-
tuaciones bancarias como desencadenantes de la crisis actual. El argumento central es que el as-
pecto más relevante de los recientes cambios en las actividades bancarias ha sido el giro dado 
hacia las rentas salariales como fuente de los beneficios bancarios. Esto se resume en dos ideas: 
1) el enfrentamiento entre las familias y las empresas financieras que lleva a un sobre-endeuda-
miento familiar en un contexto de relaciones sociales desventajosas para los deudores; y 2) hay 
razones teóricas que sostienen que haya dificultades para la recuperación ya que afecta a la de-
manda de los consumidores. De ahí se deduce que es probable que las recesiones muestren una 
duración inusualmente prolongada en ausencia de una intervención estatal importante en los mer-
cados laboral y financiero.
Lan hau politika-ekonomia marxistan oinarritzen da banku-eragiketak kontzeptualizatzeko gaur 
egungo krisiaren eragile gisa. Argudio nagusia da banku-eragiketetan azken aldian egon diren al-
daketen alderdirik garrantzitsuena bankuen irabazien iturria izateko soldata-errentetara egin den al-
daketa izan dela. Bi ideiatan laburbildu daiteke hori: 1) familien eta finantza-enpresen arteko liskarra, 
familiak gehiegi zorpetzea eragiten duena zordunentzat kaltegarria den gizarte-harremanen testuin-
guruan; eta 2) arrazoi teoriko batzuen arabera zailtasunak egongo dira berreskuratzeko, kontsumit-
zaileen eskaerari eragin zaiolako. Bertatik ondorioztatu da ziurrenik atzeraldiek luze iraungo dutela, 
estatuak ez badu esku-hartze garrantzitsurik egiten lan eta finantza-merkatuetan.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The wor ld economy is  current ly 
undergoing one of the most severe and 
distinctive crises in the history of industrial 
capitalism. The very idea that defaults on 
home mortgages by some of the poorest 
elements of the US working class would 
have wiped out leading international 
financial institutions, and triggered a 
worldwide recession, would have been 
unthinkable as recently as 25 years ago. 
The extent and uniqueness of the crisis 
have cast a sharp focus on the operations 
of leading international banks, and the 
economic and policy determinants of the 
US subprime mortgage implosion and its 
international spread. 
A number of contributions have sought 
to conceptualize, on the basis of a pluralist 
range of analytical frameworks, both recent 
changes to the activities of banks and the 
determinants of the current crisis. The 
changes in banking have been long 
documented. Berger et al (1995) provided 
early systematic evidence of the steady loss 
by US commercial banks of traditional 
business of lending to corporations and of 
captive deposit bases, attributing both 
developments to financial deregulation and 
increased compet i t ion,  as wel l  as 
technological developments. Allen and 
Santomero (2001) have noted the shift from 
net interest margins to various service fees 
in bank business models, interpreting the 
changes in banking as a shift In the relative 
importance of risk management services 
and traditional information gathering 
functions. Erturk and Solari (2007) have 
emphasized the importance of bank 
entrepreneurial alertness in the development 
of new bank business lines in a context of 
shifting financial landscapes and growing 
competition from capital markets. 
The  c r i s i s  has  seen  the  rap id 
development of an extensive literature on its 
determinants, too numerous to examine in 
de ta i l  he re .  Broad ly ,  ma ins t ream 
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contributions have located the sources of 
the crisis in combinations of ‘market failures’ 
or ‘regulatory failures’, conceptualized in 
relation to ideal, perfectly functioning 
markets.1 Heterodox and radical political 
economists have sought to identify deeper 
tendencies and processes inherent to 
capitalist markets and contemporary 
capitalism. Numerous contributions have 
emphasized and developed Hyman 
Minsky’s conceptualization of endogenous 
tendencies in compet i t ion towards 
increasingly fragile financial structures by 
enterprises.2 More recently, Foster and 
Magdoff (2008) have attributed the crisis to 
the structural shift in the US economy away 
from productive and towards financial 
activities. The authors identify this shift as 
an ultimately self-defeating capitalist 
response to the tendencies the authors find 
in contemporary capitalism towards chronic 
stagnation.3
Yet few contributions have sought out an 
integrated understanding of the current 
crisis as a distinctive result of specific 
contemporary banking practices.4 This 
paper makes a modest contribution toward 
such an understanding drawing on Marxist 
political economy.5
It argues that the most significant aspect 
of recent changes in banking activities has 
1 Incentive problems posed in mortgage origination 
and securitization have been offered as causes of 
‘market failures’, as has the absence of liquid markets 
for CDOs written over residential mortgages and the 
corresponding strong reliance on statistical models for 
the establishment of prices. A ‘regulatory failure’ 
conceptualization clearly underlies the extensive recent 
contribution offered in Brunnermeier et al (2009).
2 These include Whalen (2007), Wray (2007, 2008), 
Kregel (2008).
3 Laid out in Baran and Sweezy (1968).
4 A notable exception is Kregel (2008).
5 Based on research most recently reported in dos 
Santos (2009a), Dymski (2009), and Lapavitsas (2009).
been the turn towards individual wage 
income as a source of bank profits. Bank 
lending has been reoriented away from 
loans to enterprises and towards various 
forms of consumption and mortgage loans 
to households. Investment banking 
business has also increased for all types of 
banks, significantly driven by the rise of 
retail investment fund services.6
These deve lopments have been 
conditioned by a range of secular economic 
and financial changes in capitalism over the 
past three decades. Financial liberalization, 
the rise of institutional investors, and 
changing financial behavior by non financial 
corporations eroded traditional banking and 
forced banks to look for new business and 
funding sources. Wage stagnation, growing 
inequality and the steady expansion of 
private provision of basic necessities in 
housing, education, health and retirement, 
have increasingly forced wage earners to 
approach banks and other f inancial 
intermediaries in order to gain access to 
basic necessities and obtain some degree 
of protection against risks they now face 
individually. Although these processes are 
most clear in the US, their salient features 
are evident across a range of advanced and 
middle-income economies. 
The current crisis may be understood as 
a crisis of the distinctive type of banking 
that emerged through these changes. First, 
it was triggered by the subprime meltdown, 
which developed as banks sought to extend 
household lending to historically oppressed 
segments of the US population. The 
meltdown had irreducibly financial causes 
related to securitization, access to money 
markets, high levels of bank leverage, and 
the potentially destructive nature of financial 
6 See Wilhelm and Morris (2007).
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competition. Yet underpinning the resulting 
frenzy and bust lay lending to wage-earning 
households and the distinctive new social 
relations it defines.
And second, recent household lending 
has also given rise to record levels of 
household indebtedness across many 
economies. The current crisis has seen 
large numbers of overindebted households 
in those countries face increasing difficulties 
in servicing debt. Widespread financial 
d istress by large numbers of f inal 
consumers represents a distinctive feature 
of the current international recession that is 
likely to condition significantly the prospects 
for economic recovery.
A  Ma rx i an  app roach  to  t hese 
developments affords two distinctive 
insights motivated in detail in this essay. 
First, by pitting households aiming to secure 
access to consumption against financial 
enterprises seeking to maximize profits, 
household debt has in the present context 
c rea ted  soc ia l  re la t ions  tha t  a re 
systemat ica l l y  d isadvantageous to 
borrowers. Such disadvantages underpin 
the high effective interest rates realized by 
lenders and the sustained high profitability 
unt i l  recent ly  en joyed by f inancia l 
in termediar ies  lend ing to ord inary 
consumers. High rates of profit, in turn, 
made this lending particularly well suited for 
the development of excessive lending and 
instability in the process of financial market 
competition.
Second and most significantly, there are 
good theoretical reasons to expect that a 
crisis triggered and characterized by over-
indebtedness by wage earning households 
will pose distinctive difficulties to the 
process of recovery. At the broadest level, 
Marx (1909) identi f ied a number of 
mechanisms through which the devastation 
of capital values (including wages paid to 
variable capital) ushered by an industrial 
crisis creates the very bases for an eventual 
recovery of profitability. Such a recovery 
improves the solvency of indebted 
enterprises, facilitates financial stabilization, 
and fosters broader economic recovery. In 
contrast, a crisis sets into motion a range of 
m a c r o e c o n o m i c  p r o c e s s e s  t h a t 
unambiguously deteriorate the financial 
position of wage-earning households. The 
very real reductions in wage rates upon 
which an eventual recovery is significantly 
predicated may plunge over-indebted 
households deeper into financial distress, 
creating further financial disruptions, and 
further limiting household demand. In such 
a setting, it is likely that recessions will 
prove unusually long lasting without 
significant state intervention into labor and 
financial markets.
The rest of the paper proceeds as 
fol lows. Section two documents the 
changes in the conduct of banks and the 
related reorientations of credit systems 
toward credit to households. It also offers a 
discussion of the broad policy, labor- and 
financial-market factors conditioning these 
developments. Section three offers a 
conceptualization of the different social 
relations associated with lending to 
capital ist enterprises and lending to 
individual wage earners, based on Marxian 
schemas of reproduction. On these 
grounds, the section identifies possible 
grounds for systematically higher effective 
interest rates in lending to wage-earning 
households for purposes of consumption.
Section four offers initial analytical 
considerations suggesting that recovery 
from a recession characterized by high 
levels of household indebtedness and 
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financial distress may pose distinctive and 
stubborn difficulties. Section five concludes.
2. THE REORIENTATION OF BANKING
Banking in the advanced capitalist 
economies has undergone significant 
transformations over the past 25 years. 
Lending has been reoriented away from 
loans to enterprises and towards various 
forms of consumption and mortgage loans 
to households. Investment banking 
business has also increased for all types of 
banks, driven most significantly by the rise 
of retail investment fund services. As 
documented in dos Santos (2009a) and 
Lapavitsas (2009), these developments can 
be meaningfully understood as embodying 
an important shift in the sources of bank 
profits, away from the profits of productive 
enterprise and towards the wage income of 
ordinary people. 
Record levels of household debt have 
followed these developments. Rising 
indebtedness has imposed higher debt 
serv ic ing costs onto wage-earning 
households even in economies where 
interest rates have seen clear secular 
declines in the past 25 years. This growing 
debt burden has transformed growing 
shares of wage income into bank revenues 
and profits. 
While these processes have been 
clearest in the US, many of their central 
aspects are evident in Britain, and other 
OECD economies. They are also evident in 
many middle-income economies, where 
leading US and European banks have led 
these transformations over the past 15 
years.7 This section briefly documents these 
7 See dos Santos (2009b).
changes in bank behavior, their impact on 
the overall allocation of credit and the 
burden of debt on households, and offers a 
discussion on the determinants of these 
developments.
2.1. The New Bank Activities
Based on a study of  corporate 
disclosures for nine leading international 
banks, dos Santos (2009a) offers a 
snapshot of a banking system geared 
towards the extraction of profits from 
individual wage revenue. Activities and 
revenues centre significantly on lending to 
individuals, money-dealing fees on retail 
accounts, and the provision of retail 
insurance and investment fund services. 
Lending to individuals is clearly a major 
lending activity for leading international 
banks, especially those from the US.
Yet even these figures understate the 
importance of this type of lending. The very 
organisation of Citibank, HSBC and Bank of 
America reveals their orientation to individual 
credit. Citibank’s “Global Consumer” 
business segment generated profits of 
US$12.1 billion, or 56 percent of all profits, in 
2006. Revenues from credit cards and 
consumer lending stood at US$13.5 billion, 
or 31.6 percent of all revenues. Citigroup also 
reported a total of US$220 million in profits 
from its US student loans division alone.8 
That same year HSBC’s “Personal 
Financial Services” segment, which focuses 
on consumption and mortgage credit, 
generated US$9.5 billion in profits, 42.9 
percent of the total, ahead of commercial 
and investment banking divisions, which 
8 All information on individual banks was obtained 
from corporate Annual Reports.
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accounted for 27.3 and 26.3 percent of 
prof i ts respectively. Central to this 
performance is HSBC’s credit card network 
of over 120 million cards worldwide. Bank 
of America’s “Global Consumer and Small 
Business” segment, which focuses centrally 
on consumption and mortgage credit and 
retail accounts, accounted for 65.6% of net 
interest income that year. 
Money-dealing fees in retail accounts 
have also developed as a major source of 
bank revenue drawing on wage income. In 
2007, Bank of America and Citigroup 
received almost US$30 billion in such fees, 
with HSBC and Barclays US$23.6 billion. 
Overdraft charges, late payment fees, credit 
card charges, etc are levied as fees but are 
costs of consumer lending. Bank of America 
attr ibuted the signif icant r ise in i ts 
non interest income between 2005 and 
2006 to its purchase of British based credit 
card issuer MBNA, which resulted in 
increases in excess servicing, cash 
advance, and late fees. Similarly, Furnace 
(2004) reports that total US late credit card 
fees rose from insignificant levels in 1990 to 
over US$1 billion in 1996, and to almost 
US$9 billion in 2003. Other fees relate to 
access to new services, such as ATMs, 
phone and internet banking facilities, whose 
high installation costs have successfully 
been passed to clients by banks.9
Finally, banks have benefited significantly 
from the growing reliance on private 
pension provision by developing new mass 
retai l  services in investment funds. 
Worldwide, managed funds held a total of 
US$63.8 trillion in assets at the end of 
2006.10 Even small management fees on 
such volumes can lead to large revenues. In 
the US alone, mutual fund management 
fees have grown considerably since 1980.
In addition to these fees, fund managers 
stand in a highly advantageous position to 
profit from documented ‘behavioural’ 
tendencies by retail investors to buy while 
prices are high and sell when they are low.11 
As a result, fund management is remarkably 
profitable. In an international survey of 
money fund managers’ performance in the 
lean year of 2002, Boston Consulting Group 
(2003) found that 64 percent of the funds 
reported pre-tax profit margins above 20 
percent. A full 42 percent of the funds 
 9 See Lapavitsas and dos Santos (2008).
10 dos Santos (2009a).
11 Ibid.
Table 1
Loans to Individuals as Percentage of Total Loan Portfolio,  
December 2006 
(in %)
HSBC CITIGROUP
Bank of 
America
RBS PARIBAS DRESDNER SMFG
40.5 77.7 76.3 24.0 33.0 20.1 26.8
Source: dos Santos (2009a).
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reported profit margins higher than 30 
percent. Funds targeting retail investors 
were reportedly the most profitable.
2.2.  The growing burden and profits of 
debt
These activities have turned the debt of 
households into a major component of 
overall private debt across a number of 
economies. In Mexico, Estonia, Romania and 
Poland, where leading international banks 
have come to dominate banking markets, 
bank loans to households stood respectively 
at 40.0, 46.6, 49.8 and 54.1 percent of total 
bank credit by the start of this year.12 In 
Britain household debt reached 78.9 percent 
of all private nonfinancial debt and 160 
percent of gross disposable income by the 
end of 2007.13 In the US household debt 
reached 58.3 percent of all private non-
financial debt liabilities in mid 2006. It also 
peaked at a record 133 percent of disposable 
income in early 2008, remaining around 130 
percent in the second half of 2008 despite 
aggressive cuts in base interest rates.14
12 Calculated from respective central banks, except 
for Mexico where data from the CNBV was used.
13 Calculated from United Kingdom National 
Accounts: Blue Book.
14 Calculated from Flow of Funds of the United 
States.
All layers of the US population have been 
affected, with the heaviest proportional 
volumes of debt hitting households in the 
bottom 20 percent of the US income 
distribution, and the lightest on those 
households at the top 10 percent.
Despite recent secular trends to lower 
rates of interest, the cost to households of 
serv ic ing th is  debt  has increased 
considerably. The Federal Reserve’s 
Financial Obligations Ratio, an estimate of 
the share of disposable income paid out as 
interest and for a series of housingrelated 
services, reached a record 19.39 percent in 
the fourth quarter of 2007. Despite 
significant interest rate cuts since then, it 
still stood at 19 percent one year later, a 
level only reached during the height of the 
real estate boom in mid-2005.
The distribution of this debt burden can 
be quantified more exactly with data from 
the recently released US Survey of 
Consumer Finances. It shows this burden 
falling heavily on all households across the 
income distribution, save for those in the 
top 10 percent, with a slightly heavier 
relative burden on the two middle quintiles.
As the figures provided above on leading 
international banks suggest, they have 
developed very profitable business lines 
relying on appropriations of these growing 
Table 2
Total Mutual Fund Fees Paid by Holders in US 
(US$ billion)
1980 1985 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2005 2006
0.0 0.2 1.1 3.4 11.0 8.9 9.1 10.3 10.6 11.8
Source: Investment Company Institute.
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household outlays. Ausubel (1997) provides 
robust evidence of the exceptionally high 
levels of returns on assets US banks 
received on credit-card lending compared 
with other lending activities. In Britain, Bank 
of England figures on realized effective 
interest rates show a consistent three 
percentage point premium on returns on 
unsecured overdraft loans to households 
over equivalent loans to non-financial 
corporations between 2004 and 2008.15
15 The gap has widened to five percent in the first 
three months of 2009.
Figure 1
US HH debt and Borrowing 1951Q1 – 2008Q4
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Table 3 
US Mean Household Debt to Mean Income 1989 - 2007, by income percentile
0-20 20-39,9 40-59,9 60-79,9 80-89,9 90-100
1989 87.5 86.0 84.7 95.9 83.7 60.2
2007 258.5 154.8 170.2 182.5 178 86.7
Source: Made by the author.
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The profitability of this lending may also 
be inferred from the aggressiveness with 
which banks in the US have pursued 
acquisitions of independent firms engaged 
in this lending since the early 1990s. In 
1995 they held no more than 25 percent of 
credit card receivables in the US.16 As late 
16 Allen and Santomero (2001).
as 1999, the top ten US issuers controlled 
55 percent of the market; many of them 
were independent credit card companies.17 
Since then large banks bought their way 
into dominant market share, acquiring 
Associates, Bank One, British-based 
MBNA, and Providian. After 2004, the top 
17 Land, Mester, and Vermilyea (2007).
Figure 2
US Financial Obligations Ratio 1980Q1 - 2008Q4
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Table 4 
Average Debt Payments to Family Income 2007, by income percentile
0-20 20-39.9 40-59.9 60-79.9 80-89.9 90-100
17.6 17.2 20.3 21.7 19.7 8.4
Source: Federal Survey of Consumer Finances, 2007 Report.
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ten US issuers controlled over 90 percent 
of the market, and counted only one 
independent, non-bank enterprise.18 During 
the real estate boom of the mid-2000s, US 
banks pursues s imi lar ly aggressive 
acquisitions of independent mortgage 
companies, paving the way for severe 
losses once the subprime crisis exploded.
2.3.  The broad determinants paving 
way to crisis
A ser ies  o f  secu la r  and po l icy 
developments over the past 25 years have 
conditioned the development of household 
debt over the past 25 years and the build 
up to the current crisis. As above, these are 
clearest in the US, even though their central 
elements have been observed across most 
of the advanced and many middle-income 
economies.
On the demand side, a number of labor-
market and social policy developments 
have helped push wage earners to access 
credit and other financial services in order 
to meet basic needs. From different 
analytical perspectives, Iacoviello (2008) as 
well as Barba and Pivetti (2008) have 
established empirical and conceptual 
linkages between rising levels of income 
inequality and rising household debt in the 
US economy. Lapavitsas (2009) and dos 
Santos (2009) emphasize a closely related 
aspect: that household indebtedness has 
risen against a background of stagnant 
incomes and the growing role of private 
provision in the supply of necessities in 
housing, health, education and pension 
18 JP Morgan, Citigroup, Bank of America, the 
independent Capital One, HSBC and Washington 
Mutual held the top seven spots at the time. See Akers 
et al (2005).
services. These developments have forced 
wage earners increasingly to borrow and to 
access various insurance, investment and 
risk-management services provided by 
banks and other financial firms.
On the supply side, scope for the 
traditional banking business of lending to 
enterprises has been greatly reduced. 
Financial liberalization intensified capital-
market competition for banks, while the rise 
of private pension savings contributed to an 
explosion in the issuance of corporate 
bonds starting in the US sine the early 
1980s. Non-financial corporations have 
increasingly been able to rely on bond 
markets and retained earnings to meet their 
investment needs. Further, their real fixed 
investment has tended to fall in relation to 
GDP, while various measures involving the 
repurchase of outstanding equity through 
buybacks, mergers, and leveraged buyouts, 
often financed through bond issuance, have 
increased in significance.19
Banks were thus forced to develop new 
lines of business, which they found in the 
provision of investment banking services and 
by turning to the individual. In this 
technological and technical developments 
such as credit scoring methods and 
programs were instrumental. They permitted 
the extension of retail credit to large numbers 
of borrowers, including those at considerable 
geographical removes from banks’ head 
offices, on the basis of ‘hard’quantitative 
estimates of creditworthiness.20
As discussed above, the high relative 
profitability of this type of lending compelled 
banks increase market share and market 
size, often by aggressively offer ing 
19 See dos Santos (2009a).
20 20 See Lapavitsas and dos Santos (2008).
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consumption and mortgage credit.21 In the 
setting of low interest rates and an incipient 
real-estate bubble of the mid-2000s, this 
evolved into predatory lending to historically 
oppressed and excluded sections of the US 
population,22 fuelled by the adoption of 
investment banking funding and investment 
techniques.23 The lure of high returns, the 
very nature of financial competition, and 
hubris concerning the descriptive power of 
various new risk management techniques 
and instruments, paved the way for the 
extension of such practices into previously 
excluded ‘sub-prime’ market segments—
with disastrous effects.
Finally, governments actively supported 
household indebtedness as an increasingly 
central tenet of macroeconomic policy. In 
the US, fixed productive investment and the 
income of the bottom 90 percent of 
households started to experience significant 
falls relative to GDP in the mid 1980s.24 
Househo ld  debt  o f fe red  an  easy 
macroeconomic solution to the consequent 
demand problems. As admitted by Alan 
Greenspan (2007), it has been pursued as 
such since at least the early 1990s. 
Borrowing has risen steadily since then, as 
shown in figure 1, while the share in GDP of 
household consumption grew from a 1952-
1982 average of 62 percent to over 70 
percent by 2002. While the dot.com bubble 
offered a brief respite, the falling trends in 
investment and income resumed quickly 
21 Pre-approved credit cards have long been 
aggressively awarded to students and young adults 
since the early 1990s. Through such strategies issuers 
seek to profit from documented tendency for 
consumers to continue using the first card they ever 
obtained, regardless of its comparative interest rates. 
See Gruber and McComb (1997).
22 See Lapavitsas (2009b) in this volume.
23  See Lapavitsas (2009b) in this volume.
24 See NIPA and IRS data, which document these 
tendencies respectively.
from 2001. From then on, as Greenspan 
himself candidly notes,
“Consumer spending carried the economy 
through the post 9/11 malaise, and what 
carried consumer spending was housing. In 
many parts of the United States, residential 
real estate, energized by the fall in mortgage 
interest rates, began to see values surge.... 
Since 1994, the proportion of American 
householders who became homeowners had 
accelerated.... The gains were especially 
dramatic among Hispanics and blacks, as 
increasing affluence as well as government 
encouragement of subprime mortgage 
programes enables many members of minority 
groups to become first-time home buyers. 
This expansion... gave more people a stake in 
the future of our country and boded well for 
the cohesion of the nation....
“Capital gains, especially gains realized in 
cash [through home equity withdrawals], 
began burning holes in people’s pockets. 
Soon statisticians could see a bulge in 
consumer spending that matched the surge in 
capital gains. Some analysts estimated that 3 
percent to 5 percent of the increase in housing 
wealth showed up annually in the demand for 
all manner of goods and services.”25
Meanwhi le,  US households were 
financing ever growing levels of their 
consumption and residential investment 
with borrowings, which reached record 
between 2003 and 2006.
Conce rns  abou t  t he  moun t i ng 
significance and magnitude of household 
borrowing and debt were dismissed by 
Federal Reserve officials, who thought they 
had discovered a perpetual motion machine 
in rising house prices. Rising house prices 
appeared to improve household net worth 
and were argued to render rising levels of 
debt sustainable. No attention was given (at 
least in public) to the fact that it was in fact 
25 Greenspan (2007), p 229 230.
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rising indebtedness that helped inflate home 
prices, as can be seen in the Fed’s 
Monetary Report to Congress of 2004.
Against this backdrop the current crisis 
appears as a crisis of contemporary 
banking, and of the broader economic and 
pol icy regime that  condi t ioned i ts 
development. At the heart of these 
processes lay a new set of credit relations 
that have become central to contemporary 
capital ism: Lending to wage-earning 
households. Its distinctive social content 
and likely impact on crisis and recovery are 
pursued in the next two sections.
3.  ON THE SOCIAL CONTENT OF DEBT
Classical Marxist analysis of bank lending 
is founded on the distinctive concept of 
interestbearing (or loanable) capital. 
Loanable money capital (LMC) is a peculiar 
type of capital that is distinct from industrial 
and commercial capital. It originates from 
idle pools of money capital that appear in 
the first instance over the course of the 
circuit of industrial and merchant capital.26 
Such pools are mobilised and transformed 
into loanable money capital by the credit 
system, which channels it back into 
circulation, in the first instance as loans to 
capitalist enterprises.
Trading in LMC involves credit relations, 
that is, the advance of value against a 
promise of repayment with interest. In this 
light, banks and other financial intermediaries 
are capitalist enterprises that specialize in all 
26 See Itoh and Lapavitsas (1999).
Figure 3
US HH Borrowings to Consumption and Housing Investment
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aspects of dealing in LMC, accruing 
revenues from the difference in the price 
paid for deposits and that paid on loans. 
LMC commands repayment with interest, 
and the entire aim of its circulation is its 
return to its origin augmented by interest 
payments. Its successful reproduction may 
be described schematically as, 
M – F – M’ (1)
Where M denotes the value of the original 
LMC, F is the financial claim it becomes 
once it is advanced, and M’>M denotes the 
value returning to the owner of LMC. 
Notably, process (1) is characterized by the 
qual i tat ive ident i ty and quant i tat ive 
difference between its starting and ending 
points.
As intermediaries dealing in LMC, banks 
are specialists in overseeing success in the 
process described in (1) on both asset and 
liability sides of their balance sheets. In this 
specialization they must address difficulties 
related to the peculiar character of interest 
rates as a price of LMC. To Marx (1909),27 
the rate of interest contains an element of 
irrationality. It is a peculiar price: an 
expression of value in money, of a future 
flow of money. It also reveals no underlying 
socio economic relationship or inherent 
material aspect of social reproduction, not 
least because it is not the price of a 
produced commodity. Interest is most 
generally determined simply through the 
interaction of supply and demand. Its 
relative detachment from the material 
realities of production makes relations 
defined over LMC highly susceptible to the 
influence of broader patterns of socio-
political power.28
27 Chapter 22.
28 Lapavitsas (2003).
As a result, the extension of LMC to 
different classes of borrowers entails 
fundamentally different social and economic 
relations. This includes differences in the 
bases for repayment with interest, 
differences in the relationship between the 
value advanced through the loan and the 
borrower’s reproduction, and in the different 
reproduct ion aims and imperat ives 
governing borrowers’ need for credit. This 
section illustrates these differences with a 
comparison, at the highest level of 
abstraction, of the social content of lending 
to capitalist enterprises and that of lending 
to wage-earning households based on 
classical Marxist analysis of LMC and the 
process of reproduction of each class of 
borrower.
3.1. Lending to capitalist enterprises
The process of social reproduction of 
capitalist enterprises in Marxist political 
economy involves the self-expansion of 
value through the appropriation of surplus 
value. This is achieved as capital is 
transformed into commodities labor power 
and means of production, C(lp,mp). Those 
are combined in the production of new 
commodities, whose sale allows the 
capitalist to realize profits. Central to the 
process is the appropriation by the capitalist 
enterprise of value created by labor power 
over and above the value represented by 
wages.
Schematically,
M – C(lp,mp) – M’ (2)
Success in this reproduction requires 
that M’>M  and defines the rate of profit, 
taken here with reference a single turn over 
time,
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(3)
The rate R provides the central concern for 
all aspects of the reproduction of capital. 
Expectations about its level govern the 
operations of every stage in process (2). They 
also drive investment plans and demand for 
inputs, as well as the broader process of 
allocation of capital. Significantly, it depends 
on the quantitative relationship between M 
and M’. In order to succeed in its 
reproduction, capital must of necessity deal 
with all aspects of combining inputs to 
produce outputs and al l  qualitative 
transformations it entails. But narrow technical 
or engineering issues are not the central 
imperative of the process. That is provided by 
the quantitative expansion of value.
When extended to finance a capitalist 
enterprise, the interest payments on LMC 
represent a division of profits realized by the 
enterprise. While shaped by the unanchored 
interaction of supply and demand for LMC, 
this division must yield certain general 
regularities if overall reproduction is to be 
successful. The rate of interest typically lies 
below the general rate of profit, ensuring 
repayment with interest can proceed 
without the loss of capital values by the 
borrowing enterprise.
During normal business, the systematic 
basis for the payment of interest is the 
increased turnover of total capital achieved 
by the mobilisation of idle money and its 
application to functioning circuits of capital 
through lending. More concretely, individual 
firms will be able to increase the returns on 
their own capital by leveraging it through 
borrowing, so long as the return on applied 
capital exceeds the rate of interest. In either 
case, the advanced LMC helps generate 
the source of its own repayment with 
interest, by circulating in the borrower’s 
c i rcui t  and expanding through the 
appropriation of surplus value.
In times of crisis the rate of interest may 
generally exceed the rate of profit, posing a 
very different potential set of relations 
between lender and borrower. Debt proves 
destructive of capital and disruptive of 
accumulation.29 Its repayment poses 
elements of borrower expropriation, as 
repayments may require the liquidation of 
assets and the transfer to lenders of value 
secured by the borrowing enterprise 
independently of the loan.
Finally, in the social relation posed by 
LMC advanced to enterprises the borrower 
approaches the loan on the same basis as 
banking capital: seeking to secure the 
quantitative augmentation of capital M into 
M’. The resulting social relations are defined 
between social equals who, at this level of 
abstraction, have comparable expertise in 
seeking the expansion of value.
3.2.  Lending to wage-earning 
households
Matters are fundamentally different in 
credit relations between banks and wage-
earning households. Under capitalist 
conditions wage earners have no means 
other than the sale of their own labor power 
as the means to secure access to 
necessary consumption. Schematically, 
their reproduction may be represented as,
C – M – C’ (4)
Here wage earners sell labor power C, in 
order to obtain an equivalent quantity of 
value as money M, which allow the 
29 Itoh and Lapavitsas (1999).
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purchase of equally valued consumption 
commodities C’.
This reproduction is fundamentally 
different from that of LMC and industrial 
capital. Its purpose does not relate to 
changing quantitative magnitudes, which 
stay constant at every step. It lies in the 
qualitative difference between the original 
commodity and the commodities accessed. 
The governing imperative in this process is 
the fulfil lment of consumption needs. 
Significantly, the development of such 
needs, norms, habits and expectations 
takes place through complex non-
economic, social processes.30
Debt plays a distinctive role here. It may 
allow wage earners to access commodity 
values C’ in excess of the value of their 
current earnings and any possible savings. 
The rationales for the payment of interest 
are far more complex here than in the debt 
of industrial enterprises, and require 
considerable separate analysis. Mainstream 
contributions like those inspired by Milton 
Friedman’s (1957) Life Cycle or Permanent 
Income hypotheses, point to the gains in 
borrower welfare arising from consumption 
smoothing by consumers facing uneven or 
stochastic income paths. In addition to not 
inqui r ing into the determinants of 
consumption preferences, such views imply 
a long-term individual calculus that bears 
little resemblance to the actual behavior of 
the mass of wage earners towards debt 
and an uncertain economic future.31
A perspective far more likely to yield 
fruitful research has been recently advanced 
by Cynamon and Fazzari (2008), who argue 
30 See, for instance, Lapavitsas (2003), Saad-Filho 
(2002), or Cynamon and Fazzari (2008).
31 See Miles (2004), Campbell and Cocco (2003), 
for illustrations. 
that, as with consumption habits, ‘financial 
preferences evolve as social norms [and] 
interact with both cultural trends and 
inst i tut ional  changes in household 
finance’.32 Under this light, the motivations 
and social content of household debt and 
consequent flows of interest payments 
should be understood with reference to the 
concrete evolution of consumption habits, 
norms and expectat ions and the i r 
relationship to wage levels.
Two distinguishing general features of 
borrowing by wage-earning households 
condition its social content. First, it 
i nhe ren t l y  poses  an  e l emen t  o f 
expropriat ion. Money loaned out to 
individuals for consumption or mortgages 
does not ordinarily generate the value from 
which it is to be repaid with interest.33 
Interest payments are generally made from 
subsequent wage receipts by borrowers, 
representing an appropriation of value 
borrowers have secured independently of 
the loan.
Second, in this borrowing wage-earning 
households are primarily concerned with 
the satisfaction of qualitative consumption 
needs, as represented by (4). And while in 
this pursuit these households generally 
ensure the maintenance of quantitative 
equality across trades, trading over LMC 
poses serious diff iculties due to the 
indefiniteness of its value in exchange. In 
such trades they face profit-maximizing 
lenders, specialized in the expansion of 
value given by (1), who will approach the 
relationship from a clearly advantageous 
position.
32 Cynamon and Fazzari (2008), p 1.
33 The obvious exceptions relate to equity and 
residential real estate bubbles.
At the heart of the matter: household debt in contemporary banking and the international crisis
69
Ekonomiaz N.º 72, 3.er cuatrimestre, 2009
In the concrete setting of stagnant 
wages, rising inequality, and growing 
reliance on private provision of housing, 
health, and education, wage earners have 
been increasingly forced onto debt relations 
in order to secure their own reproduction. 
The distinguishing general features of 
consumption debt and this element of 
social compulsion suggest that the transfers 
of wage income in the form of interest 
payments may be usefully understood as 
usurious and containing an important 
exploitative element.
They also help identify the general class 
and concrete historical bases for the high 
profitability generally associated with this 
type of lending. High rates of profit, in turn, 
made this lending particularly well-suited for 
the development of excesses in the process 
of financial market competition, and helped 
pave the way to the current crisis. At the 
broadest level, the usurious and exploitative 
elements of this lending helped condition 
the vulnerabilities that burst open in August 
2007 in the US.
4. DEBT, CRISIS AND RECOVERY
The evolution of debt, its burdens on 
borrowers and its sustainability have been 
long and widely understood to be an 
important factor in the or ig in and 
propagation of capitalist crises. Hyman 
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis,34 
most notably, identifies in the competitive 
economic process endogenous tendencies 
for increasingly fragile corporate debt 
structures, advancing them as the basis of 
capitalism’s inherent and recurring crises. 
Fisher’s (1933) debt deflation advances 
34 Laid out succinctly in Minsky (1992).
corporate over indebtedness not only as 
the tr igger, but also as the central 
transmission mechanism of economic 
depressions, leading to distress asset 
sel l ing, fa l l ing asset pr ices, and a 
contraction of credit, confidence, profits, 
and output.35 Even neoclassical economists 
have sought to identify in debt and its 
associated ‘transactional problems’ 
potential sources for the propagation in 
time of one-off exogenous shocks.36
These and related contributions have 
helped offer insights into a number of 
important elements of the current crisis.37 
But in themselves, they provide scant bases 
for approaching the potentially distinctive 
role and origins of household over-
indebtedness in the development and 
potential recovery from a crisis. This section 
offers initial elements for a conceptualisation 
of such possible differences drawing on 
Marxist political economy.
The analytical emphasis in Marxist 
approaches to crises lies not on the 
evolution of debt, interest rates or financial 
structure, but on various tendencies 
inherent to the process of accumulation 
that periodically reduce rates of profit.38 
Recurring systemic reductions in profitability 
not only inhibit investment and trigger 
industrial crises, but also compromise the 
ability of enterprises to service debt, 
potentially creating significant financial 
disruptions that augment the size, duration 
and scope of the crisis.
When considered from the standpoint of 
the current crisis, Marx’s understanding of 
35 Fisher (1933), p 342.
36 See, for instance, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
37 See in particular Kregel (2008).
38 See Day (1981) and Sweezy (1970) for summary 
discussions.
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profits and their role in the origins and 
recovery from crises afford two important 
insights. First, the current crisis did not 
immediately originate as a result of 
disruptions to the profitability of capitalist 
enterprises. Its spread followed from the 
severe international financial disruptions 
that followed unexpected bank losses in 
highly leveraged investments in claims on 
US wage-earning households. I t  is 
historically novel in that regard.
Second and most significantly, recovery 
from a crisis triggered and characterised by 
unprecedented levels of household debt 
poses a range of distinctive difficulties. The 
depression in the values of all forms of 
capital during a classical industrial crisis 
helps create the conditions for the eventual 
recovery of profit rates, financial stability, 
and aggregate demand. Capi ta l is t 
enterprises able to pursue operational and 
financial restructuring, or simply capable of 
securing access to funds, may f ind 
attractive pickings amid the general carnage 
of a depression. Wage earners, in contrast, 
face no analogous vulturous opportunities. 
Deflation in consumer goods does not in 
i tse l f  fac i l i ta te  ‘ rest ructur ing’ ,  the 
development of new income sources, and 
eventual boosts in demand. In fact, 
improvements in their financial situation 
generally rely on reductions in consumption 
and increases in wages, both of which 
stand opposed to the needs of a market-
based recovery.
Th i s  sec t ion  o f f e rs  p re l im ina ry 
considerations on these matters. First, it 
considers Marx’s own analysis of possible 
sources of restored profitability amidst the 
devastation wreaked by a general crisis. It 
then considers the situation of a a crisis 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  h o u s e h o l d 
overindebtedness. 
4.1.  Traditional crises, enterprises and 
recovery
For Marx, capitalism is incapable of 
sustained and stable accumulation and the 
corresponding development of productive 
capac i t i e s  and  l i v i ng  s tanda rds . 
Competition, individual appropriation and 
the corollary economic anarchy help render 
the system vulnerable to disruptions to 
profitability, its very organizing principle. 
Marx and subsequent contributions to 
Marxist political economy have advanced a 
number of inherent processes that tend to 
erode prof i tabi l i ty  in contemporary 
capitalism. Those include tendencies 
present in competitive accumulation to 
over-investment and over-production, the 
possibility of sustained and significant gains 
in average wages, and possible difficulties 
in the realization of the value of produced 
commodities due to demand problems.39
Whatever its immediate causes, a decline 
in profitability may quickly ripple throughout 
the system as cuts in investment and 
e m p l o y m e n t  d i s r u p t  t h e  m y r i a d 
interdependencies upon which previous 
investment, production, consumption plans 
had been made. In the ensuing economic 
decline, capitalist society finds itself with an 
overabundance of the entire social process 
of capital: means of production and labour 
power organized according to the 
imperatives of profit extraction, the various 
claims on the resulting surplus, and all 
attendant social  re lat ionships. This 
overabundance of capital generates losses 
to all those with claims on it. To Marx, 
crises set in motion competitive struggles 
between capitalists over the distribution of 
these losses,
39 See Day (1981) or Sweezy (1970).
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‘the loss in not equally distributed over all 
the individual capitalists, but according to the 
fortunes of the competitive struggle, which 
assigns the loss in very different proportions 
and in various shapes by grace of previously 
captured advantages or positions, so that one 
capital is rendered unproductive, another 
destroyed, a third but relatively injured but 
momentarily depreciated, etc.’40
The goal of this competitive process is to 
ensure ‘equilibrium is restored by making 
more or less capital unproductive or 
destroying it.’ The chief mechanisms for this 
destruction involve not so much the 
physical destruction of capital, but the 
destruction of the various forms of capital 
value, including those contained in financial 
claims and capital goods.
‘That portion of the value of capital which 
exists only in the form of claims on future 
shares of surplus-value of profit, which 
consists in fact of creditor’s notes on 
production and its various forms, would be 
immediately depreciated by the reduction of 
the receipts on which it is calculated. One 
portion of the gold and silver money is 
rendered unproductive, cannot serve as 
capital. One portion of the commodities on the 
market can complete its process of circulation 
and reproduction only by means of an 
immense contraction of its prices, which 
means a depreciat ion of the capital 
represented by it. In the same way the 
elements of fixed capital are more or less 
depreciated.’
Variable capital also depreciates through 
reductions in wages, as ‘The stagnation of 
production would have laid off a part of the 
working-class and thereby placed the 
employed part in a condition, in which they 
would have to submit to a reduction of 
wages, even below the average.’ Finally, 
40 All quotes from Marx in this section are found in 
Marx (1909), p 297-299.
Marx understood quite well that these 
processes set into motion monetary and 
financial disruptions that compounded and 
extended the original crisis.
While Marx included the recurrence of 
such devastating crises in his general 
indictment of capitalism, he identified them 
not as terminal systemic crises but as part 
of a continuous and disruptive process of 
crisis and recovery in capitalism. In fact, 
much as he identif ied in successful 
accumulation the seeds of crisis, Marx also 
pointed to the elements of crises that 
helped pave the way for an eventual 
recovery.
‘the fall in prices and the competitive 
struggle would have given to every capitalist 
an impulse to raise the individual value of his 
total product above its average value by 
means of new machines, new and improved 
working methods, new combinations, which 
means, to increase the productive power of a 
given quantity of labour, to lower the 
proportion of variable to the constant capital, 
and thereby to release some labourers.... The 
depreciation of the elements of constant 
capital itself would be another factor tending 
to raise the rate of profit. The mass of the 
employed constant capital, compared to the 
variable, would have increased, but the value 
of this mass might have fallen. The present 
stagnation of production would have prepared 
an expansion of production later on, within 
capitalistic limits.
‘And in this way the cycle would be run 
once more.’
In contemporary terms, a setting of falling 
prices for capital goods, labor inputs, and 
corporate securities, create opportunities 
for restored rates of profit for some 
enterprises. Firms that happen to be in 
better financial states, or simply to possess 
better access to finance, will generally be in 
a position to implement operational and 
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financial restructuring measures that 
buttress their profitability, improve their 
solvency, and boost demand.
In addition to the operational measures 
noted by Marx, some enterprises may 
divest themselves of particularly problematic 
areas of operations. Such measures 
potentially yield significant present losses, 
but pave the way for higher expected profit 
rates, on the basis of which new investment 
may be undertaken.41 Similarly, a setting of 
depressed asset prices offers particularly 
auspicious opportunities for profitability for 
those enterprises capable of developing 
and undertaking production of new product 
lines, particularly when they are capable of 
defending monopolistic rents.42
Falls in prices for corporate securities 
open further possibilities for financial and 
economic stabi l ization and eventual 
recovery. Depreciated debt claims on 
corporations may be bought up by stronger 
investors or financial intermediaries. Such 
purchases may entail significant for even 
fatal losses for incumbent holders, 
diminishing or eliminating their capacity to 
extend additional credit and compounding 
the crisis. But capital losses also ensure 
new holders face considerably better yields, 
possibly placing them in better positions 
from which eventually to help restore credit 
activity.
Fall ing equity prices may facil itate 
corporate takeovers and other types of 
mergers and acquisitions. These may be 
undertaken in conjunction with the pursuit 
of the various operational restructuring 
measures laid out above. They may also be 
associated with the concentration and 
41 See Donaldson (1994).
42 As emphasized by Schumpeter (1976).
centralization of capital, through which the 
resulting corporation may enjoy enhanced 
economies of scale or market power. In 
either event, the purchase of equity may 
faci l i tate an eventual restorat ion of 
profitability.
In sum, the destruction of capital values 
in their various forms facilitates processes 
of operational and financial restructuring by 
some productive enterprises. These 
measures lay the basis for the eventual 
recovery of profitability, solvency, and levels 
of activity across productive capitalist 
enterprises. They also contribute to the 
recovery of financial stability and levels of 
activity, paving the way for the new upswing 
in accumulation.
4.2.  Household debt and the current 
crisis
There are compelling theoretical reasons 
to expect the prospects for market-based 
recovery to be considerably dimmer during 
the current recession. The unique social 
and economic content of household 
indebtedness throws up dist inct ive 
obstacles to the process of economic 
recovery unlikely to be surmounted without 
significant state intervention.
The crisis has placed mil l ions of 
households under considerable financial 
d i s t r ess .  Who lesa l e  f und ing  and 
securitization of loans to households have 
all but disappeared, while on-book bank 
lending has also contracted severely. This 
has cut credit flows that were increasingly 
cen t r a l  t o  sus t a i n i ng  househo ld 
consumption. As shown in figure 3, US net 
household borrowing as a share of 
consumption and residential investment 
had reached record levels in mid-2005. As 
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a result, the collapse of credit has triggered 
staggering falls in consumption, which 
dropped by a record 1.58 percent on real, 
year-on-year terms in the final quarter of 
2008.
Such record falls in consumption have 
taken place despite the exhaustion of 
expansionary monetary policy, which has 
taken the Fed Funds rate to an average of 
0.15 percent in April 2009.43 And while the 
reduction of base rates has doubtlessly 
improved the financial position of many 
indebted households, overall debt and 
servicing costs measured in relation to 
personal disposable income are yet to fall 
43 It is notable than in the two previous episodes of 
significant contractions in consumption, in 1973-74 
and 1980, US base interest rates were rising 
significantly.
significantly, as suggested by figures 1 and 
2 above.44 Similarly, default rates on carried 
commercial bank loans to households have 
continued to rise.
While this evidence is doubtlessly 
preliminary and the evolution of these 
variables requires ongoing monitoring, it 
points unambiguously to severe household 
financial distress. Based on the discussion 
in section 4.1 above, it is possible to identify 
a number of considerations that suggest 
financially distressed households create 
distinctive difficulties to the process of 
market-based recovery.
44 Despite the cuts and actual deflation, US average 
credit card rates stood at 13.5 percent by the end of 
2008, only slightlybelow the recent peak of 15.2 in 
September 2007 or the 14.7 percent average of 2006-
2007. In Britain realized returns on credit card loans 
stood at 12.4 percent, the highest rate since 2001.
Figure 4
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As with productive capitalist enterprises, 
a recession directly affects the incomes of 
wageearning households. Unemployment 
and falling real wages tends to reduce the 
sector’s labor income, while falling asset 
prices further limit consumption capacity 
and forces potentially dramatic falls in 
household net worth. Yet unlike productive 
enterprises, these processes do not in 
themselves offer wage-earning households 
new opportunities to increase their revenues 
and improve financial solvency.45
At the broadest level, there is limited 
scope for operat ional and f inancial 
restructuring of households.46 Fundamental 
45 The obvious possible exception involves the 
unlikely inflation of a new housing bubble.
46 Current difficulties with selling securitized claims 
on the debt of households also point to difficulties in 
restructuring financial claims on households.
adjustments in consumption are likely to be 
much more difficult and socially disruptive 
than corporate restructuring. Further, 
consumption is an inalienable process, and 
individual consumers cannot be ‘taken over’ 
and ‘restructured’ by other consumers. 
Finally, even when entrepreneurial discovery 
takes place among final consumers, it is 
inherently limited in its scope to various 
economies in consumption unlikely to 
provide boosts to broader economic 
activity.
As a result, improvements to the situation 
of financially distressed wage-earning 
households wi l l  re ly exclusively on 
reductions in consumption and increases in 
wages, both of which stand opposed to the 
needs of a market-based recovery. Most 
significant for the purposes of this essay, a 
recovery led by productive capitalist 
Figure 5
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enterprises is premised, most significantly 
among several  factors, on general 
reductions in the real wage. In fact, the 
persistence and depth of the Great 
Depression have long been attributed in 
considerable part to the downward 
inflexibility of wages.47
Herein lies a distinctive paradox posed by 
recovery from a recession characterized by 
f inancia l  d istress by wage-earning 
households. A recovery led by capitalist 
enterprises is predicated on reductions in the 
real value of wages. Even if such reductions 
succeed in fostering eventual economic 
recovery, in the short run they would further 
erode the capacity of households to service 
debt, compounding financial stresses. Yet 
further financial stresses would also arise 
from a failure to reduce the real value of 
wages, which, without additional state 
interventions, would quickly translate into 
rising rates of unemployment.
An eventual return of inflation, often 
looked to as an aid to the process of 
deleveraging, also poses dist inctive 
difficulties. Rising price levels may reduce 
real debt burdens, but this will depend on 
the capacity of lenders to maintain the real 
value of debt, and the capacity of borrowers 
to maintain the real value of their incomes. 
Particularly in a recessionary setting, wage 
earners will generally not be very successful 
in maintaining the real value of money 
wages in  re lat ion to consumpt ion 
commodities sold by functioning capitalists 
and to claims on households by financial 
enterprises.
At the broadest level, during typical 
industrial crises falling wages and inflation 
47 47 See, of course, Keynes (1973), and Bernanke 
(1995) or Bordo et al (2000).
effect transfers and shifts of value from 
financial enterprises and wage earners to 
productive capitalist enterprises. Because 
those enterpr ises monopol ize  the 
appropriation of new value, and some of 
them may be able to found their economic 
plans on the yields this value represents on 
levels of  investment depressed by 
recession, such transfers may help pave 
the way for an eventual recovery.
The current crisis presents a more 
complex picture. The return of financial and 
economic stability poses the need for 
transfers from financial and productive 
enterprises to wage earners. Such transfers 
are unlikely to take place on market terms, 
either through higher wages or through 
inflation. Without significant state intervention, 
the process of household deleveraging is 
likely to continue to involve weak levels of 
consumption, ongoing losses on household 
credit, and consequent disruptions to 
broader processes of economic recovery.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Drawing on Marxist political economy, 
this essay has sought to document the 
economic significance and distinctiveness 
of rising levels of debt by wage earning 
households, advancing them as a defining 
feature  o f  contemporary  bank ing, 
macroeconomic policy, and of the current 
crisis. Household debt is at the centre of 
the turn by banks to individual income as a 
source of profits. It provided the staple for 
the speculative binge that triggered the 
current crisis, and it lies at the heart of the 
broader economic and policy regimes that 
appear to be unraveling as a result.
From this perspective, the essay 
advanced preliminary analytical discussions 
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